Mark Garcia, author of a mammoth volume on Calvin’s view of union with Christ, has finally started to respond to J.V. Fesko’s several year long interaction with his work. These posts will be worth following.
Much of Fesko’s criticism exists in seminal form in a review article he wrote of Garcia’s book (and one other) in Ordained Servant. Having argued that Garcia’s view of Calvin represents the influence of Richard B. Gaffin of Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, Dr. Gaffin was asked to respond to Fesko’s article. Dr. Gaffin’s response is worthy of a careful reading, since it is one of the few places where he very carefully interacts with criticisms of his his own historiographical and theological work.
Still, as Garcia points out in the recent blog posts, it is not a little odd that he himself was not asked to respond directly to Fesko. In any case, Fesko has gone on to recently write a book on union with Christ and its relationship to justification in the Reformed tradition, which is not a little concerned with controverting what he identifies as the “Gaffin school” interpretation of Calvin and Reformed theology on the matter.
As one views this controversy from the “cheap seats” (as they say), it would appear that Garcia and Fesko represent something of a dispute between a group of theologians and historians with ties to Westminster Seminary in California (Fesko, Horton, etc) and a similar group associated with Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia (Gaffin, Garcia, etc).
It is important to point out, however, Garcia’s adamant protestation that there is no such thing as a Gaffin (and consequently, Westminster Philly) “school” of Calvin interpretation. What is ironic from my perspective is that one might, however, make a case for a unique Westminster Escondido “school” of Calvin interpretation (and indeed, an interpretation that extends to Reformed theology generally on these issues). Fesko’s oft repeated statement that justification is the “legal ground” of union with Christ is, for instance, somewhat odd language in the Reformed community, but this emphasis is stated in exactly the same language by Horton in his recent treatment of the topic.
No matter who has the better Calvin argument, it seems to me that there are grounds for a theological tertium quid here. For Garcia’s Calvin and Gaffin, union with Christ is logically prior to justification, which is the legal aspect of that union. For Fesko’s Calvin and Horton, justification as a divine speech-act is the legal basis for our union with Christ and is thus logically prior to our existential union with Christ. In my judgment, both sides could perhaps be satisfied if we distinguished between justification as God’s pronouncement and our “being justified” or the “state of justification” which is the effect of that pronouncement. The divine speech-act, “Let there be” results in the “and there was” of our union with Christ in which our state of righteousness is so. One advantage of this view, in my judgment, is that it helps us to relate justification with divine calling. The effective call might simply be understood as the divine justifying speech act which results in the “and it was so” of our justification in Christ (Rom. 8:29-30). It is God who justifies (v. 33) and we who are justified. From this perspective, however, Horton unnecessarily reduces the initial speech-act of our salvific encounter with Christ to justification. Given that there is a definitive aspect to both sanctification and certainly to adoption, one might argue that the initial speech-act must also be seen as one action in several aspects (filial, legal, etc). This is consonant with Gaffin’s response to Fesko (linked above). The legal basis for God’s call and promise is Jesus for me who becomes united to me through faith (the “and there was” of God’s pronouncement). And so, rather than the speech-act of justification being the “legal basis” of our existential union with Christ, it seems to me that it is better to say that the redemptive-historical work/justification of Christ (1 Tim. 3:16) is the legal basis for the justifying speech-act! Our personal justification, adoption, and definitive sanctification are simultaneous effects and aspects of God’s single gospel locution, made effective by the applying work of the Holy Spirit. But from this perspective, as well, Gaffin could perhaps use to emphasize the aspects of justification, adoption and sanctification which exist in God’s speech-acts logically prior to the existential union with Christ in our personal history.
Whether this is satisfactory or not, this conversation is an important one. And perhaps the surfacing of these tensions is a good thing. We need to witness frank and open dialogue about these matters with a view to unity in theological formulation and ultimately pastoral application.